1. THE HUNGARIAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND THE 2022 ELECTIONS
The Hungarian political landscape is characterized by several distinctive features that set it apart within Central and Eastern Europe. First some general remarks: Hungary operates under a parliamentary system with a four-year electoral cycle, currently in its ninth legislative term. Elections are conducted via a general, direct, and secret ballot system. Notably, Hungary has never experienced early parliamentary elections, making it unique within Central and Eastern Europe. This uninterrupted fulfilment of governmental mandates also distinguishes Hungary within Europe, where early elections have occurred sporadically in recent decades. This stability underscores the resilience and predictability of Hungary’s political system.[i]
Until 2006, no Hungarian government succeeded in securing re-election, with each administration being replaced after a single term. This pattern reflects a deeply rooted political culture characterized by societal resistance to authority and a pronounced sense of individualism. The 2006 re-election of the socialist government marked a significant departure from this trend, yet it triggered deep societal cleavages and political polarization. These disruptions and divisions within Hungarian society are critical for understanding the complexities of the nation’s political landscape and the interplay between governance and public sentiment.
Since 2010, Hungary has been governed by a conservative administration under Viktor Orbán, leader of the Fidesz Party. The government is now past the midpoint of its legislative term, following its victory in the most recent general election nearly three years ago, at which it secured a fourth consecutive electoral mandate with a two-thirds parliamentary majority. Hungary is presently witnessing the implementation of a robust liberal-conservative policy agenda. Notably, the parliamentary elections held on 3 April 2022 marked the ninth such event since the end of the communist era. The governing party secured 55 per cent of the list votes, setting an unprecedented record both proportionally and in absolute terms, with 3,060,000 votes cast in its favour. Achieving a fourth consecutive victory with such a commanding majority remains unparalleled in the European political landscape.
The Hungarian electoral system is structured as a majoritarian model, combining proportional representation for list mandates with constituency-based voting. Of the 106 constituencies, 87 were secured by the governing party, while only two cities in the south and Budapest were won by the left-leaning opposition party. Notably, Budapest was, with one exception, overwhelmingly dominated by the left in the April 2022 elections. This represents a classical political divide, comparable to patterns observed in other countries within the region.
The Hungarian Parliament comprises 199 mandates, with 106 directly elected constituency representatives and 92 allocated as list mandates under proportional representation. Additionally, one minority representative, specifically from the German minority in Hungary, holds a full parliamentary mandate, inclusive of voting rights and formal recognition, reflecting the institutionalized acknowledgment of national minorities.
In the April 2022 elections, six opposition parties, spanning the political spectrum from the far left to the far right, including green and liberal factions, formed a unified opposition platform against the governing coalition, effectively creating a ‘catch-all’ opposition entity. Despite this coalition, they secured only 57 mandates, accounting for 28 per cent of parliamentary seats. Additionally, a smaller far-right party, associated with revisionist ideologies that lack significant resonance within Hungarian society, garnered only 5 per cent of the vote. In a nutshell, the governing party received 3 million votes, whereas the opposition secured 1.9 million, highlighting a decisive electoral outcome that granted the ruling coalition a significant advantage over its opposition counterparts. In the parliament chamber at the moment (2025), there is a two-thirds majority for the governing parties, Fidesz and the Christian Democrats. Fidesz is not a part of the European People‘s Party (EPP). In June 2024, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) of Hungary, a junior coalition partner in the government, also withdrew from the EPP and its parliamentary group. This decision was prompted by the EPP’s admission of the Tisza Party, led by opposition figure Péter Magyar, into its ranks. KDNP leaders, including Chairman Zsolt Semjén and MEP György Hölvényi, expressed the view that the EPP’s leftward shift and the inclusion of the Tisza Party were incompatible with KDNP’s Christian democratic values.
2. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CONSULTATIONS IN HUNGARIAN DEMOCRACY
Hungary has developed a unique form of direct democratic engagement known as ‘National Consultation’ (Nemzeti Konzultáció), which has been an integral part of governance under the administration of Prime Minister Orbán since the early 2010s. This initiative reflects the government’s commitment to enhancing public participation in decision-making and ensuring that national policies align with the views of Hungarian citizens.[ii] Unlike traditional forms of referenda, which may be limited to specific electoral cycles, National Consultations are conducted regularly on key policy matters, providing a continuous feedback loop between the government and the population. The government views this as an important tool to counterbalance elite-driven policymaking, ensuring that major political decisions reflect broad societal consensus. By sending questionnaires directly to households, National Consultations allow citizens across all regions and social backgrounds to express their views, making the process inclusive and representative, which underlines the deliberative aspect of Hungarian democracy.
The Hungarian government considers these consultations a safeguard of national sovereignty, particularly in matters where external actors, such as the European Union, may exert pressure on domestic policies. For example, in consultations regarding migration, economic sovereignty, and family policies, the government has sought to uphold Hungary’s right to self-determination, ensuring that policies reflect the will of the nation rather than external influences. Furthermore, National Consultations strengthen civic engagement by encouraging political awareness and active participation among Hungarian citizens. By directly involving the public in shaping government policies, this mechanism fosters a culture of democratic responsibility, allowing people to have a say in the country’s most pressing issues.
In comparison to other European democracies, where public input is often restricted to elections or highly controlled referenda, Hungary’s model represents an innovative approach to participatory democracy. The frequency and breadth of these consultations enable the government to respond dynamically to changing public sentiment, ensuring that national policies remain aligned with the interests of Hungarian society. From a comparative perspective, Hungary’s use of plebiscitary mechanisms is relatively unique within the European Union. While other states utilize referenda and citizen initiatives, these typically involve greater institutional checks and balances. The Hungarian model, by contrast, demonstrates how direct democratic instruments can be leveraged to foster a stronger connection between the government and the electorate. This approach allows for a high degree of policy responsiveness and ensures that major legislative initiatives are rooted in public sentiment. However, it also raises broader discussions within political science regarding the implications of such mechanisms for institutional governance and democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe.
Overall, National Consultations reflect Hungary’s commitment to democratic engagement, national sovereignty, and direct communication with its citizens. By prioritizing the voices of its people, the government ensures that decision-making processes are not only transparent but also rooted in the will of the Hungarian nation.[iii]
3. HUNGARIAN INDIVIDUALISM
Following an overview of the general political landscape, a presentation of lesser-known aspects of Hungary will provide a nuanced understanding of the country’s context. The Hofstede Index of Individualism measures the extent to which societies value personal autonomy over collective identity.[iv] Hungary consistently ranks among the top in the Hofstede Index of Individualism, often securing first or second place, thereby being recognized as one of the most individualistic societies globally. This high degree of individualism reflects a unique conceptualization of liberty and freedom, distinct from other cultural contexts. For instance, while Polish perspectives often interpret liberty as a collective right or as a struggle for national sovereignty, the Hungarian view frames freedom predominantly as an individualistic endeavour, frequently focused on personal autonomy and specific aspects of private life. This divergence highlights differing normative frameworks regarding the interplay between individual and collective agency in Central and Eastern Europe.
In Hungarian society, the concept of individual freedom and liberty holds a multifaceted significance, as reflected linguistically in the word ‘szabadság’, which denotes both freedom, liberty, and holidays, symbolizing also liberation from work and daily obligations. Under the communist regime, this individualistic mindset was further refined, as circumventing state authority and bureaucratic controls became a strategic necessity to achieve personal comfort. Following the Revolution of 1956, the regime implemented measures aimed at improving living standards, albeit at the cost of significant state indebtedness. Compared to other communist states, Hungary offered relatively favourable living conditions, fostering a societal mentality oriented toward pragmatic problem solving and adaptability. This is epitomized by the cultural tendency to seek alternative pathways—symbolically described as entering through a side gate rather than the main one—emphasizing the prioritization of individual agency and innovative solutions over rigid conformity to prescribed options.
This attitude continues today. One famous Hungarian political statement is: ‘It is really hard to govern Hungary with its 10 million freedom fighters.’ In Hungary, societal responses to policy implementation frequently manifest in widespread opposition and public dissent, contrasting with the acceptance often observed in other countries, where such measures are regarded as normative and uncontroversial.
4. THE EVENTS OF 2006 AND THEIR IMPACT
The events of 2006 in Hungary, during the tenure of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s social-liberal government, were marked by a significant political and social crisis. The government, having secured re-election through falsified budget figures and misrepresentation of the country’s economic situation, faced widespread protests. These demonstrations were met with severe police brutality, resulting in numerous injuries, including cases of permanent disability such as the loss of eyes, limbs, and hands among protesters. The disproportionate use of force by Hungarian police during this period drew international condemnation and heightened European attention to the deteriorating state of democratic norms and human rights in Hungary.
The year 2005 marked a significant period of political contention in Poland, characterized by socio-political struggles, while 2006 was a pivotal year for Hungary, marked by profound political fractures and tensions within its domestic political landscape.[v]
Since 2006, Fidesz has consistently maintained a dominant position in Hungarian politics, leading polls with approximately 50-per-cent support for nearly two decades. This enduring popularity reflects widespread public rejection of any return to socialist governance, shaped by collective memory of the Gyurcsány administration’s tenure, which was marked by police brutality during protests and significant political, economic, and moral challenges. In previous years—up until his unexpected withdrawal from the public life in May 2025—the association of Gyurcsány, a former socialist prime minister, with the opposition further consolidated voter reluctance to embrace the opposition. In recent developments, Péter Magyar, a former Fidesz member, established an opposition party that has since joined the European People’s Party (EPP). This party has begun to gain traction within Hungary’s political landscape, presenting a possible challenge to Fidesz by appealing to diverse voter demographics. This shift has introduced a new dynamic to the opposition.
What has been happening since 2010? It can be said that after the crashes and disruptions of 2006, the main task set out was the rebuilding of the country, while also shaping a new individualism and at the same time maintaining a balance between individualism and the common good.
The aftermath of the political and social upheaval in Hungary in 2006 posed significant challenges to governance and the restoration of public order, particularly in areas of public administration and institutional reform. The 2010 parliamentary elections, often described by Orbán as a ‘revolution at the ballot box’, underscored this shift, as the conservative Fidesz secured a decisive victory with 53 per cent of the vote, compared to the 19 per cent garnered by the socialist opposition.
5. A WORK-BASED SOCIETY
Hungary is currently undergoing a comprehensive transformation aimed at reconstructing a work-based society, a cornerstone of the government’s socio-economic agenda. Over the past decade, approximately one million new jobs have been created, signifying a substantial achievement in labour-market expansion. This policy aligns with the governing party’s fundamental philosophy, which emphasizes the integration of citizens into the workforce as a means of fostering economic productivity and social stability. By 2024, the number of employed individuals in Hungary had risen to 4.678 million, compared to 3.7 million twelve years prior. This represents a notable increase in labour-market participation, accompanied by significant structural reforms in the tax system. Previously, only half of the 3.7 million employed individuals contributed to the tax base due to pervasive tax loopholes that undermined the formal economy. These reforms reflect the government’s commitment to formalizing the labour market, enhancing tax compliance, and promoting sustainable economic growth.
Hungary has implemented significant measures to formalize its economy, including the establishment of an electronic payment system that links transactions directly to tax authorities, thereby minimizing opportunities for tax evasion. The nation employs a flat personal income tax rate of 15 per cent, which applies uniformly across various income types, which makes the country attractive. Additionally, Hungary maintains a corporate tax rate of 9 per cent, one of the lowest in the EU. The government also emphasizes fiscal responsibility by opposing policies that could lead to excessive national debt, thereby safeguarding future generations from financial burdens.[vi] The government is currently engaged in discussions concerning the EU’s resilience funds and has expressed apprehension regarding the formation of a debt union. Hungary’s historical experience with substantial foreign debt during the communist era has led to a cautious stance on public borrowing. This perspective is informed by past instances in which limited wealth generation from foreign capital resulted in significant national indebtedness. Consequently, the administration advocates for fiscal policies that minimize reliance on public debt, viewing it as an imprudent economic strategy. Hungary has also been strong in cutting taxes in recent years, as reflected in a US tax reduction ranking, which evaluates Hungary as one of the strongest performers in reducing taxes in recent years. Taking all these aspects and our historical development into account, it is no surprise that Hungary opposes the ‘debt union’. Hungary emphasizes the need for an alternative framework for Europe’s future, expressing surprise at Germany’s financial strategy, which involves accumulating substantial debt in increments of billions, a practice perceived as economically precarious.[vii]
6. MIGRATION
It is essential to distinguish between legal and illegal migration. Hungary supports lawful migration, hosting numerous foreign professionals and students, with significant communities from Germany, Norway, and Cyprus. Approximately 300,000 individuals are employed by 6,000 German companies operating in Hungary, reflecting substantial migration for work. Over the past three years, the number of people migrating to Hungary has exceeded those leaving. Regarding illegal migration, Hungary enforces a highly restrictive policy, aiming to preserve its social and cultural framework and determining its demographic composition independently, without mirroring developments in other European nations Hungary’s historical experience of prolonged foreign occupation and rule, with full sovereignty achieved only since 1990, informs the collective desire to preserve its autonomy and national character. This sentiment transcends political divisions, with even a significant majority of left-leaning voters supporting policies aimed at maintaining the country’s current composition and self-determination. Consequently, proposals from Brussels regarding quotas and other regulatory measures are perceived not merely as external impositions but as challenges to Hungary’s sovereign authority to shape its demographic and societal framework independently. Hungary currently presents itself as a predominantly religious and ethical society, though not exclusively Catholic. Unlike Poland or Croatia, Catholicism does not command an overwhelming majority, encompassing around 50–60 per cent of the population. A significant Calvinist community coexists, leading to Hungary often being regarded as a Calvinist nation. Contemporary societal debates and divisions can be analysed through the lens of these religious affiliations, with Catholicism prevailing in the western regions and Calvinism in the eastern areas, each shaping distinct conceptions of Hungarian statehood. Notably, statehood during the Turkish occupation was preserved in Transylvania, a region characterized by its Protestant and Calvinist orientation.[viii] This historical context aligns with the prominence of Calvinist leadership within the governing party.
7. NATIONALITIES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES
Hungary is internationally recognized for its diverse nationalities and national minorities, totalling 13 groups, including the Roma as the largest, followed by the German, Romanian, Slovak, Ukrainian, Ruthenian, Greek, and Armenian communities. These minorities have enjoyed political representation for more than ten years, a measure introduced by the conservative government to ensure their parliamentary inclusion. The German minority holds a distinct position, having secured sufficient votes to obtain a full parliamentary mandate with voting rights. This representation extends its influence over other minority groups, as the German minority representative serves as the chairman of the Committee on Nationality Affairs, symbolizing a degree of leadership while advocating for broader minority interests. In Hungary, minorities residing in areas where they constitute more than 20 per cent of the total population are entitled to establish their own self-governance, allowing them to use their native language and independently preserve and promote their cultural heritage.[ix]
Individuals can obtain a driving license, hold weddings, participate in elections, or correspond with the administration in any officially recognized minority language. This policy reflects a strong commitment to linguistic diversity and minority rights, representing a source of national pride, particularly as such practices are not universally implemented across Europe, despite the normalization of multilingualism within the country. Hungary is also proud of its rich and diverse heritage stemming from the many different ethical, religious, and linguistic backgrounds.
In the southern regions of the country, certain villages have a demographic composition wherein 50–60 per cent of the population identifies as ethnic Germans, contributing to the approximately 186,000 individuals with German roots residing within the country. This demographic primarily comprises people holding Hungarian citizenship but of German descent, with significant representation in the southern regions, while the northern areas are similarly characterized by a prominent presence of the Roma minority.
Hungary’s approach to national minority policies serves as a symbolic gesture toward its own ethnic kin living abroad, totalling over two and a half million Hungarians in Serbia, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Croatia, Austria, and Slovenia. This highlights a deliberate effort to set a positive example of minority rights protection and treatment in the broader regional context.
8. REFUGEES VS MIGRANTS AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE
Hungary unequivocally aligns with Ukraine amidst the ongoing conflict in its eastern vicinity, extending substantial support to Ukrainian nationals. Since the beginning of the conflict, approximately 1.2 million Ukrainian refugees have entered Hungary and more than one million were provided help by the country—a significant figure for a nation with a population of 9.5 million. While many refugees have continued their journey westward, Hungary currently hosts around 350,000 Ukrainians, a proportion of whom are not ethnic Hungarians. These people are receiving assistance and are being integrated into Hungarian society. This situation contrasts markedly with the 2015 migration crisis, during which Hungary faced an influx of people from, for example, Afghanistan and other regions. The Hungarian government maintains a strict migration policy, distinguishing between refugees fleeing immediate conflict zones and migrants from countries considered safe. Consequently, individuals arriving from Afghanistan in 2015 were not recognized as refugees by Hungary, as they had traversed multiple safe countries en route to the EU.
Since the outbreak of the conflict, Hungary has actively supported Ukraine, affirming its territorial and sovereign integrity, which aligns with Hungary’s strategic interest in maintaining a free and independent Ukraine as a buffer state between itself and Russia. Having experienced prolonged periods under Russian influence, Hungary prioritizes avoiding such circumstances in the future and fully endorses and assists Ukraine in its pursuit of sovereignty. There exists no fundamental division in this regard; however, divergence arises concerning the efficacy of sanctions. Hungary has consistently supported and implemented EU-sanction measures. It also adheres to EU consensus on such policies. Nevertheless, the country holds a nuanced perspective on the current effectiveness regarding the associated sanctions. While the Hungarian government acknowledges Ukraine’s sovereignty and has provided humanitarian assistance to Ukrainian refugees, it has expressed reservations about the efficacy of sanctions imposed on Russia. Prime Minister Orbán has criticized these sanctions, asserting that they have adversely affected Hungary’s economy. The Hungarian government also fully rejects the European Commission’s planned introduction of legal measures that aim to phase out the EU's imports of all Russian gas and liquefied natural gas by the end of 2027.
9. FAMILY POLICIES
Hungary allocates 6 per cent of its GDP to family support policies, a globally unique commitment. This encompasses tax benefits, marriage incentives for young couples through reduced taxation, and housing support for property acquisition. Additionally, expecting parents can receive approximately €30,000, a sum that becomes non-repayable with the birth of more children. Maternity benefits surpass the salary level of women for up to 160 days, transitioning to a capped amount of approximately €600 monthly until the child reaches two years of age.[x] Upon returning to work, women retain this financial support alongside their regular income, a notable shift from previous policies requiring repayment. The guiding principle of these measures is to empower women to make autonomous choices regarding family planning. The birth rate has risen from 1.2 to 1.6 in recent years, reflecting positive dynamics, yet falling short of replacement levels. The policy framework emphasizes that effective family support necessitates strong collaboration with women.
10. THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE
Until 2010, Hungary experienced a predominantly one-sided media landscape, with approximately 80 per cent of journalists and media outlets oriented towards leftist perspectives. A shift began gradually before 2010, as conservative groups founded new media outlets to balance the ideological spectrum. Presently, Hungary exhibits a diversified media environment, encompassing a broad range of public opinion. Visitors often note the wide selection of magazines and newspapers available, reflecting this diversity. Notably, the majority of major media platforms in Hungary maintain a critical stance toward the government. These include the largest television network, RTL, and the leading newspaper, Népszava, a left-leaning social-democratic publication. Furthermore, four of the five largest online portals—444, 24.hu, Telex, and Index—oppose the government, with only Origo expressing a government-friendly perspective. Additionally, 8 out of 11 leading weekly publications are critical of the government.
An analysis of media circulation figures in Hungary reveals a relatively balanced distribution, with a slight advantage for outlets adhering to leftist political ideologies. Consequently, the assertion of a one-sided media landscape in Hungary does not align with empirical evidence. A comprehensive examination of the data and the current media environment underscores this balanced representation.
CONCLUSION
In summary, it can be observed that Hungary remains relatively underrepresented in terms of international awareness, which may be attributed to linguistic barriers, limited communicative outreach, and the lack of extensive networks at the international and European levels. This situation is compounded by the notable critique directed at Hungary due to its uniquely conservative government, which holds an unprecedented two-thirds majority, a configuration rarely seen in the European context. The diminishing influence of leftist-liberal actors often leads to attempts to elevate domestic Hungarian conflicts to the European level, advocating for policies to address these disputes. However, such efforts have frequently encountered limited comprehension among European counterparts, who tend to interpret the presence of vocal dissent as indicative of systemic issues, reflecting a recurrent perception within the broader European discourse. Nevertheless, since 2022 Hungary’s opposition landscape has undergone significant transformations. In the April 2022 parliamentary elections, the opposition coalition ‘United for Hungary’, encompassing parties from democratic socialist to conservative and far-right ideologies, suffered a substantial defeat to Prime Minister Orbán’s Fidesz. This loss prompted introspection within left-wing parties, leading to strategic realignments. Notably, 2024 saw the emergence of the Tisza Party, founded by former Fidesz member Péter Magyar, which has reshaped opposition dynamics by positioning itself as a centre-right alternative. This ascendancy compelled traditional left-wing parties, such as the Democratic Coalition (DK), the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), and Dialogue (Párbeszéd) to try to form alliances in an effort to consolidate support and counterbalance the growing influence of Tisza, which failed.
Hungary’s conservative reform agenda has demonstrated considerable success across various domains, including migration policy, family support, economic development, and national security, with the country widely regarded as among the safest in Europe. The notable economic dynamism achieved under conservative governance presents a challenge to prevailing narratives, illustrating that such conservative reforms can yield positive outcomes, thus positioning Hungary as a contentious exemplar for the success of conservative politics.
As Andreas Rödder, a prominent CDU-affiliated scholar, has remarked, ‘It’s a country model that constitutes the exact opposite of the European liberal identity policies’, underscoring the predictable nature of the criticism directed at Hungary.
[i] Zoltán Tibor Pállinger ‘Electoral System Change in Hungary 2011–2014: Legal and Political Impacts’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 30, Nr. 4, 2016, 701–721; Zsolt Enyedi, ‘The Contested Politics of Positive Neutrality in Hungary’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 13, Nr. 2 ,2015, 390–409;
[ii] Zsolt Enyedi, ‘The Role of National Consultations in Hungary’s Electoral Politics’, East European Politics, vol. 36, no. 3, 2021, 345–367
[iii] Gábor Gulácsi and Ádám Kerényi, ‘Hungary and the European Union: The Drift Towards Disintegration’, Perspectives on Federalism, vol. 15, no. 1–2, 2023, 1–28
[iv] Ayman Balawi and Esther Wanjiru Wachira, ‘HRM Practices on Foreign-owned Companies in Hungary’, Modern Management Review, vol. 26, no. 4, 2021, 7-24
[v] Mihály Rosonczy-Kovács, ‘An Alliance for Liberty - Part I’, Hungarian Conservative (16 November 2022), https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/an-alliance-for-liberty-part-i/ , accessed 20 May 2025.
[vi] European Commission, ‘Economic and Fiscal Policies of Hungary 2024‘, https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu , accessed 5 February 2025
[vii] ‘Orban: “Wir schulden Deutschland gar nichts” – Kritik an Deutschlands Schuldenpolitik’, Focus Online, (25 Februrary 2016), https://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/wir-schulden-deutschland-gar-nichts-zank-in-der-fluechtlingskrise-orban-kritisiert-schroffen-ton-aus-deutschland_id_5312679.html , accessed 5 February 2025
[viii] Nicholas Parsons, ‘The Reformation in Hungary’, Hungarian Review, January 2018, https://hungarianreview.com/article/20180119_the_reformation_in_hungary/ , accessed 5 February 2025
[ix] Alexander Rasthofer and Tristan Csaplár, ‘Minderheiten in Ungarn‘, Faktenwissen Ungarn, 2022/11, ‚https://magyarnemetintezet.hu/documents/doc/PRINT_22-11_Minderheiten%20in%20Ungarn%202.%20Aufl.%202024.pdf , accessed 5 February 2025
[x] Böhmn Márton, ‘Pfeiler der ungarischen Familienpolitik‘, Faktenwissen Ungarn, 2022/10, https://magyarnemetintezet.hu/documents/doc/PRINT_22-10_Pfeiler%20der%20ungarischen%20Familienpolitik.pdf , accessed 5 February 2025